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Abstract 
 
In May 2006, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) presented a 
report to Parliament entitled What Price Privacy? The report highlighted the 
extent of the illegal trade in personal data. Arguing that the risk of security 
breaches had increased largely as a result of the rise of the ‘data-based 
society’, the ICO called for a change in the legislation to permit jail sentences 
of up to two years in respect of offences under section 55 of the Data 
Protection Act 1998. In February 2007, the UK government stated its intention 
to adopt that recommendation. 
  
This paper examines the current UK policy approach to regulating the illegal 
flow of personal information, and the lead taken by the UK Information 
Commissioner. Reference is made to the ‘privacy toolbox’, where data 
protection legislation is combined with measures such as codes of practice 
and privacy impact assessments (PIAs). Comparisons are made with the work 
of overseas regulators. In addition, the current regulatory framework regarding 
section 55 offences is examined, with the author attending an ICO 
prosecution hearing in December 2006. The paper concludes by arguing that 
a greater emphasis needs to be placed on the assessment of privacy risks 
posed, in particular, by the expansion and proposed merger of government 
databases. Adoption of PIAs could help achieve this. 
 
 
This article was submitted on 14 February 2007, and updated on 4 May 2007. 
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Stolen identity: regulating the illegal trade in personal data in the ‘data-
based society’ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In May 2006, the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) used its 
powers under section 52(2) of the Data Protection Act (DPA) for the first time 
to present a report to Parliament. The publication, What Price Privacy?, 
highlighted the extent of the illegal trade in personal information as diverse as 
current addresses, ex-directory telephone numbers or records of calls made, 
criminal records and bank details.1 The report added that the growth of the 
‘data-based society’ increased the risk of further security breaches. Although 
section 55 of the DPA 1998 made it an offence to ‘knowingly or recklessly’ 
obtain, disclose or ‘procure the disclosure’ of personal information without the 
consent of the organisation holding the data, the ICO argued that the existing 
non-custodial penalties offered little deterrent.2 The report therefore called for 
a change in the legislation to permit jail sentences of up to two years for those 
convicted of section 55 breaches. In February 2007, the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs (DCA) stated its intention to adopt the ICO’s 
recommendations.3 
 
This paper examines the current UK policy approach to regulating the illegal 
flow of personal information, and the lead taken by the UK Information 
Commissioner. Reference is made to the ‘privacy toolbox’, where government 
data protection legislation has been combined with data protection 
supervisory authorities, codes of practice, privacy impact assessments (PIAs) 
and technological solutions.4 It is argued that, with the UK government 
supporting its proposals to amend the DPA 1998 to combat illegal data 
sharing, the UK ICO is taking a greater role in the formation of policy in this 
area, although in other areas of policy they lag behind privacy regulators in 
countries such as the Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand. This article 
begins by outlining some recent developments that have transformed the UK 
into a ‘data-based society’.5 Attention is paid to the promotion of greater 
joined-up working between government agencies, and the gathering of data 
originally collected for distinct purposes in new databases such as the 
Children’s Information Sharing Index. The creation of single, comprehensive 
repositories not only enhances the ability of the government to monitor its 
citizens, but also presents great opportunities for illegal data sharing. 
Although the UK government have decided against constructing a single 
National Identity Register system,6 the launch of a significant policy review in 
January 2007 into sharing information across government departments has 
led to accusations that a single ‘super-database’ will indeed be created.7 
Additionally, consideration is given to the security of personal information held 
in the private sector, where databases have been built up by retailers, 
telecommunications companies, utilities and financial institutions.  
 
Secondly, the current regulatory framework regarding section 55 offences is 
examined. Attention is given to the enquiries conducted by the Commissioner 
as part of Operation Motorman, which underpinned the recommendations set 
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out in What Price Privacy?, and the follow up report published in December 
2006.8 The author gained further insight into the existing prosecution process 
through attendance of an ICO prosecution hearing in December 2006.9 In 
addition to the report’s main recommendation on custodial sentencing, 
attention is given to other suggested measures - such as inter-agency 
protocols and addendums to professional codes of ethics - that the ICO are 
also trying to promote as part a balanced ‘privacy toolbox’. The role of Privacy 
Impact Assessments (PIAs), well established in jurisdictions such as Canada 
and New Zealand and long advocated by the ICO, are given serious 
consideration.  
 
This paper concludes by assessing the changing role of the UK data 
protection supervisory authority. Comparisons are drawn with overseas data 
protection regulators, where the emphasis is on anticipating privacy risks 
posed by information systems.  
 
 
2. The ‘privacy toolbox’ 
 
In their analysis of data protection legislation, Bennett and Raab (2006) 
discussed regulatory interdependence, in which a nation’s public policies to 
protect personal privacy are linked with the actions of public and private 
organisations that operate outside its borders.10 However, whilst laws have 
increasingly converged around a substantive set of international standards – 
the most important being the 1995 European Union (EU) Data Protection 
Directive – the way they have been implemented in practice has resulted in 
divergences, as well as doubts as to the effectiveness of statutory approaches 
in coping with rapid technological developments that have significant 
consequences for privacy.11 It has been suggested that tools such as codes of 
practice, PIAs and privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) provide a flexible 
means of improving data protection compliance.  
 
Discussion of these tools is limited by space, but it is worth stating that they 
have been developed to good effect overseas. The Netherlands, for example, 
has a tradition of using codes of practice12 and PIAs have been developed in 
the private sector by Royal Philips Electronics to ensure compliance of global 
IT systems.13 Moreover, the Netherlands has collaborated since the mid-
1990s with the Canadian province of Ontario over the appraisal of 
technologies for protecting privacy.14 However, progress has been slow in the 
UK. The UK data protection regulator was not granted authority to develop 
codes of practice until the DPA 1998 came into effect in 2000.15 Moreover, 
ICO and expert calls for the development of PIAs, particularly in relation to the 
National Identity Register, have so far gone unheeded.16 However, as 
governments and businesses came to terms with the introduction of new 
information systems and the convergence of existing technologies there is 
strong case to be made for a combination of privacy measures covering 
collection, storage, security, sharing and management of personal 
information. 
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3. Databases and data security 
 
Under the slogan 'joined-up government', the UK government has over the 
period of a decade stated its commitment to greater coordination and 
integration of public services. This began with the Modernising Government 
white paper,17 and was developed further in the policy papers: Privacy and 
data sharing (Cabinet Office, 2002),18 and Transformational Government.19 
The latter called for three key ‘transformations’ towards: 
 
- Citizen and business centred services, improving choice of interaction 
with public services; 
- Shared services across the public sector, including human resources, 
finance, information management and customer service. This would 
improve efficiency and reduce duplication, for example, by slimming 
down the 130 central government call centres; 
- Professionalism including the appointment of Customer Service 
Directors and improving the management of information technology 
programmes. 
 
The paper outlined a broad programme, continuing beyond 2011, towards a 
vision where ‘boundaries between departments, between central and local 
government, and between public, private and voluntary sectors become less 
important and less visible to the citizens and business’ (Cabinet Office, 2005: 
18-19).20  
 
A number of agencies and teams have been established to deliver on 
government aspirations. For example, the Department for Health established 
NHS Connecting for Health in April 2005 to deliver the National Programme 
for IT, aimed at integrating systems connecting over 100 000 doctors, 380 000 
nurses and 50 000 other health professionals in order to provide patient-
centred care.21 Progress to date has been mixed.22 Within the Department for 
Education and Skills, a project team has been established to set up the 
Children’s Information Sharing Index - a database of England’s 11 million 
children, accessible to ‘authorised practitioners’ in education, health, social 
care, youth offending and some voluntary services.23 Information held will 
include the child’s name, address, date of birth, an identifying number, and 
details of schools, GPs and parents or carers. It is due to be operational by 
the end of 2008.  
 
However, concerns have been raised that the promotion of shared services, 
particularly where children’s data is involved, can cause ‘actual harm’.24 Three 
decades ago, Rule had written about the attractiveness to governments, and 
perhaps inevitability, of systematic cooperation between individual 
surveillance systems: 
 
The effect of such cooperation, when it does occur, is distinctly to 
enhance the position of the systems of control vis-à-vis their 
clienteles, to increase their surveillance capacity, and to conduce to 
change in the relations between agencies of surveillance generally 
and the public at large.25 
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The establishment of a National Identity Register (NIR) under the Identity 
Cards Act 2006 arguably turns what Rule termed a ‘symbiosis’ of surveillance 
systems into a reality. Information will be held on three existing IT systems26 
and may include personal information, residential information, identification 
information (such as signature and biometric data), personal reference 
numbers (for example, national insurance and passport numbers), record 
history and details of when a Register entry has been accessed and people to 
whom such information has been provided. Although this represents a change 
from the previous policy of holding data on a single information system, some 
campaign groups expressed concerns that security would be further 
compromised as the new NIR will involve ‘mixing up’ new data with existing 
data.27 
  
In the private sector, the security of confidential information held by utilities, 
telecommunications companies and financial service providers among others 
has come under scrutiny. Supermarkets have long held databases of 
customer shopping habits, and Tesco’s suffered adverse publicity after 
piloting tiny location-identifying RFID tags.28 Yet, in spite of this, investment in 
security standards and related qualifications remains low. According to a 
study commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), three 
fifths of UK businesses are still without a security policy, and just 44% of 
companies had conducted security risk assessments in the previous year.29 
More worrying, at a time when more customers and suppliers are granted 
direct access to corporate systems, 30% of transactional websites do not 
encrypt the transactions that pass over the internet.30  
 
Clearly, opportunities exist for organised and opportunist criminals. Much of 
the personal information held in both public and private sectors is accessible 
either online or via call centres. And, as the recent cloning of a biometric 
passport demonstrated, even the heavily promoted RFID technology available 
is far from secure.31  
 
 
4. What Price Privacy?  
 
Context 
 
The above developments are important, describing the societal context in 
which the ICO currently operates. Nevertheless, according to ICO solicitor 
Philip Taylor, it was frustration experienced by an ICO prosecution under 
section 55 of the DPA 1998 in the summer of 2005 that caused the 
Commissioner to present a special report to Parliament.32  
 
Legal proceedings had started after the ICO attended a search of premises in 
Surrey in late 2002, under a warrant issued by Devon and Cornwall 
Constabulary. The raid concerned the suspected misuse of the Police 
National Computer (PNC) by serving and former police officers.33 However, 
vehicle registration numbers found at the scene suggested that the suspect 
also had an ‘inside track’ to the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA). 
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This resulted in the ICO launching an investigation dubbed ‘Operation 
Motorman’ into data protection offences,34 and to a raid of the premises of a 
private detective working in Hampshire. Documents seized revealed a 
network of contacts illegally acquiring information on the private detective’s 
behalf based at British Telecom, the DVLA and the PNC. Other papers 
included correspondence between the detective and journalists working for a 
number of prominent national newspapers and magazines. The information 
supplied by the private detective to his clients included details of criminal 
records, driving licence data, ex-directory telephone numbers and mobile 
phone records. This evidence, together with the suspect’s detailed records of 
work carried out, ‘documented literally thousands of section 55 offences’.35  
 
In all, the ICO activity under Operation Motorman resulted in the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) charging four people with corruption offences, 
including the private detective. Two pleaded guilty to corruption charges and 
two to charges under section 55 of the DPA 1998. However, the issuing of a 
suspended sentence to the first defendant in this case, a police civilian 
worker, ‘frustrated’ the subsequent ICO prosecution by setting a precedent for 
the ‘lesser’ section 55 offences, for which the court was unable to impose any 
sentence stronger than a conditional discharge.36 As the ICO stated in What 
Price Privacy?: 
 
This was a great disappointment to the ICO, especially as it seemed 
to underplay the seriousness of section 55 offences. It also meant that 
it was not in the public interest to proceed with the ICO’s own 
prosecutions37, nor could the Information Commissioner contemplate 
bringing prosecutions against the journalists or others to whom 
confidential information had been supplied.38 
 
Recommendations 
 
The ICO reported on the issue in May 2006, with What Price Privacy? 
receiving wide media coverage39. The report’s central recommendation was 
for the introduction of custodial sentences of up to two years for persons 
convicted on indictment and up to six months for summary convictions. The 
aim was to ‘discourage this undercover market and to send out a clear signal 
that obtaining personal information unlawfully is a serious crime’ (ICO, 2006a: 
5).40 The ICO stated that the police supported the threat of imprisonment as a 
suitable deterrent. Under the existing system, the police have to arrest for 
malfeasance or corruption offences in order to secure a custodial sentence. In 
future, they would prefer to use section 55 as the basis for their investigations 
and believe that they would achieve quicker convictions, if custodial 
sentences were introduced. 
 
Further recommendations stated that: 
 
- The Security Industry Authority41 should include a caution or conviction 
for a section 55 offence among the grounds for refusing or revoking the 
licence of a private investigator; 
- The Association of British Investigators42 should extend its National 
Occupational Standard for Investigation to include explicit reference to 
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section 55 offences, and undertake other specific measures aimed at 
raising standards among private investigators; 
- The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) should take a much stronger 
line in tackling press involvement in the illegal trade; 
- The ICO will not hesitate to prosecute journalists identified in previous 
investigations who continued to commit section 55 offences; 
- The Office of Fair Trading should amend its 2003 Debt Collection 
Guidance - directly linked to fitness to hold a consumer credit licence - 
to condemn section 55 offences.43 
 
The press came in for particular criticism in What Price Privacy? with the 
report referencing the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, 
Media and Sport’s investigation into privacy and media intrusion. The Select 
Committee had not been convinced by the press’s compliance with codes of 
conduct, concluding with a list of intrusive data-gathering practices that 
amounted to ‘a depressing catalogue of deplorable practices’.44 The ICO also 
cited examples retrieved during their Operation Motorman investigation, 
where records contained personal data of individuals who had either tenuous 
links with the celebrity circuit or had no obvious newsworthiness. The 
Commissioner reported this emerging evidence to the PCC, who ‘issued a 
Note reminding the press of its data protection obligations, including the 
possibility of committing an offence when obtaining personal information’.45  
 
Finally, the report concluded by inviting a number of regulatory and 
professional bodies that appeared ‘to exercise control or influence over those 
who may engage in the buying or selling of personal information’ to respond 
to specific questions about the steps they will take to achieve good practice in 
their information trading activities.46 The ICO also requested responses and 
further evidence from consumer and citizens’ organisations.  
 
Reaction and government consultation 
 
According to Taylor, the reaction from the media was ‘more positive than 
expected’ given the criticism the report levelled at the profession.47 However, 
despite the PCC issuing a further reminder in August 2006 to journalists about 
their obligations under its code of conduct, the press self-regulator has been 
criticised for its unwillingness ‘to instigate an inquiry of its own’ into illegal 
trawls for personal data.48 In fact, the imprisonment of Clive Goodman in 
January 2007, royal editor of the News of World, for conspiring to intercept 
voicemail messages in the Prince of Wales’ household demonstrates that 
journalists have continued to flout the law in this area.49 Generally, the 
‘broadsheet’ press were supportive of the ICO report and recommendations 
with The Observer’s coverage being singled out as being especially positive. 
The more ‘popular’ press, whilst agreeing that the illegal practices were 
undesirable, were reluctant to support the imposition of custodial sentences.50  
 
In July 2006, the DCA published a consultation paper proposing to amend the 
DPA 1998 to allow custodial sentences matching the recommendations of the 
ICO report.51 The consultation paper sought views on whether the 
amendments: 
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- Represented a proportionate sanction for the courts to be able to use; 
- Acted as an effective deterrent to those who unlawfully trade in and 
otherwise deliberately or recklessly misuse personal information.52 
 
The consultation period ended in October 2006. In proposing the 
amendments, the government sought to reinforce their data sharing agenda 
by demonstrating the security of personal information once it had been 
shared. Thus, increasing the penalties available to the courts would: 
 
- Provide a greater deterrent to those who seek to knowingly or 
recklessly disclose or procure the disclosure of confidential personal 
information without the consent of the data controller; 
- Provide public reassurance that those who are successfully prosecuted 
may, dependent on the gravity of the offence, be sent to jail; 
- Achieve parity of approach across a number of disparate pieces of 
legislation which deal with similar type offences.53 
 
Essentially, the government viewed the introduction of custodial sentences for 
a section 55 offence as a harmonising measure, whereby the Data Protection 
Act 1998 ‘sets the standards for offences relating to the wilful misuse of 
personal information’ across the public and private sectors.54 Examples where 
custodial sentences had already been put in place for specific offences 
relating to misuse of personal data included: 
 
- The Identity Cards Act 2006 (section 27) for unauthorised disclosure of 
information from the NIR, once implemented; 
- The Social Security Administration Act 1992 (section 123) for misuse of 
personal data; 
- The Commissioners for the Revenue and Customs Act 2005 (section 
18(1) and 19(1)) for unauthorised disclosure by Revenue and Customs 
officials. 
 
Safeguards would be built in to protect people who were deceived into 
disclosing information they believed they had the legal right to release.  
 
In its assessment of the potential impact of the proposed changes, the DCA 
noted that section 55 cases did not often end up in court, that just 26 
prosecutions had had been taken forward in the last four years. Of those, only 
five were serious enough to warrant prosecution in the Crown Court. The 
government did not consider that the creation of the new sanction would 
cause the level of prosecutions to rise ‘as the offence is already in existence 
and has a prosecution history’. Consequently, in February 2007, the DCA 
confirmed that section 60 of the DPA 1998 would be amended to permit 
custodial sentences for section 55 offences ‘as soon as parliamentary time 
allow[ed]’.55 
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5. Current prosecution process and follow-up report 
 
The Clifford case 
 
The Clifford case, involving the prosecution of a private detective in Surrey, is 
typical of those highlighted by the ICO and DCA. Anthony Clifford of 
Chessington, Surrey obtained and sold information on a number of individuals 
through his private investigation agency trading as MRS. He impersonated 
officials to ‘blag’ personal information from companies and banks. A search of 
his premises resulted in the seizure of some 250 investigation files consisting 
mainly of requests for bank account details, mortgage account details, credit 
card statements, itemised telephone billing and credit reference checks.56 
Additionally, Clifford used a female employee to obtain personal information 
relating to a number of women.  
 
In all, Clifford pleaded guilty to 16 counts of illegally obtaining and selling 
personal information under section 55 of the DPA 1998 and to a further 
offence of failing to notify his data processing activities with the ICO. The 
prosecution mentioned a number of aggravating factors, namely that: 
 
- Data had been collected for commercial gain;  
- Substantial profits had been made; 
- Clifford had involved others in his offending; 
- The offences had been committed in running of a business. 
 
During the hearing at Kingston Magistrates’ Court in December 2006, 
Clifford’s defence barrister reminded the bench that his client had pleaded 
guilty at the first opportunity and that most of his work was ‘completely lawful’. 
He also stated that a lot of Clifford’s work was from Invex, a company run by a 
former police officer, and that his client felt pressured into taking on illegal 
work. Although the work was ‘unlawful’ and ‘regrettable’, it should be noted 
that the ‘boundaries between what was illegal and what was legal became 
blurred’.57   
 
The magistrate, Judith Hopkins, in sentencing Clifford stated that his offences 
were ‘very serious’ and ‘systematic and planned’. Consequently, the 
defendant was sentenced to an 18 month community order including 150 
hours unpaid work per offence. In addition he was ordered to pay a 
contribution to prosecution costs of £2000 within 6 months. After the case, 
Taylor declared that he was ‘pleased’ with the verdict58. Nevertheless, 
according to one correspondent present at the hearing, Hopkins ‘hinted that 
the court would have considered sending [Clifford] to prison if the law had 
allowed it’.59 
 
The Clifford verdict followed another high profile case, that of Sharon and 
Stephen Anderson. The Andersons, who traded as Analysis and Business 
Research, made £140,000 a year selling personal data.60 They were 
convicted in November 2006, pleading guilty to 25 offences of obtaining and 
selling personal information unlawfully and asking for another 97 to be taken 
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into consideration. In addition, they were fined a total of £7,500. Taken with 
the recommendations in What Price Privacy?, this activity demonstrates the 
ICO’s intention to target the growth in the illegal in personal data. Moreover, 
with the prominent law firms and retailers being among the ultimate recipients 
of the information ‘blagged’ by Clifford and the Andersons, the ICO have 
extended their investigations to include organisations who purchase this 
data.61 
 
In this policy area, the ICO is taking a lead. If the DPA 1998 is amended, the 
UK will become one of the very few countries where custodial sentences are 
written into the primary data protection or privacy legislation. As a 
comparison, New Zealand, whilst particularly active in encouraging data 
protection compliance via tools such as Privacy Impact Assessments – 
discussed later in this paper - does not have a custodial option in its Privacy 
Act for this type of offence. Instead, prosecutions of that nature are usually 
made under the Crimes Act 1961 or the Summary Offences Act 1981.62  
 
Follow-up report 
 
The ICO’s follow-up report, What Price Privacy Now? was published in 
December 2006.63 The document reviewed progress over the previous seven 
months and detailed responses from the organisations identified as having a 
role to play in reducing demand for illegally acquired personal data and in 
raising awareness of the problem. Although a majority supported the ICO’s 
proposals, the Commissioner found a few responses discouraging. For 
example, some media bodies, such as the BBC, failed to unequivocally 
condemn section 55 offences and were suspicious that the ICO’s proposals 
could deter journalists from pursuing stories that were in the public interest. In 
response, the Commissioner stated that he was: 
 
‘…not proposing the introduction of any new criminal offences and 
that there exist[ed] a defence in the Act for anyone acting in the public 
interest.’64  
 
In addition, a table was published disclosing media publications identified from 
Operation Motorman, the number of transactions each publication had been 
involved in, and ‘how many of their journalists (or clients acting on their 
behalf)’ had used their services. A total of 31 publications were listed including 
tabloids, broadsheets and magazines. The ICO concluded the report by 
stating their commitment to continue to raise awareness and work with any 
organisation that wants to raise standards or produce clear guidance on their 
data protection obligations.65  
 
 
6. Towards a balanced ‘privacy toolbox’? 
 
The threat of custodial sentences, although a powerful deterrent, is not the 
only compliance tool available. In a nod towards the work of Bennett and 
Raab, the Information Commissioner has promoted a mixed approach to the 
regulation of privacy.  
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In the last decade, this has been evidenced through the development of 
codes of practice for CCTV and employment practices, good practice notes 
and the regulator’s support of European Commission model clauses for 
personal data transferred outside of the European Economic Area.   
 
In What Price Privacy?, it is clear that this work has been extended. The 
report refers to joint working protocols with the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), British Telecom and 
police forces around the country. Whenever DWP or HMRC staff identify 
suspect calls, a bogus call report is completed. The reports are collated and 
analysed, and when patterns are identified the cases are passed to the 
Information Commissioner for investigation.66 Moreover, the ICO’s 
Investigations Unit liaises almost weekly with police forces, ‘often at their 
request for advice’.67 Cooperation with the police has been enhanced through 
the decision of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to include 
unauthorised disclosures of personal data in the annual risk assessment 
carried out by the police service and the Serious and Organised Crime 
Agency. Finally, ACPO have included confidentiality in a code of professional 
standards that is currently in development.68   
 
Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) 
 
In assessing risk of privacy abuses another tool, the PIA, has been 
increasingly promoted by the ICO, especially in relation to the proposed 
NIR.69 PIAs gained currency in the 1990s as governments and businesses 
came to terms with the introduction of new information systems and the 
convergence of existing technologies. They are seen as a systematic risk 
assessment tool that can be usefully integrated into decision-making 
processes.70 As such, the application of PIAs could reduce the risk of data 
being traded illegally. The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner, whose office 
has been active in the promotion of PIAs, defined the tool as: 
 
A systematic process that evaluates a proposal in terms of its impact 
upon privacy.71 
 
In the US, where PIAs have been mandated for new federal-level public 
sector projects by the e-Government Act 200272, they have been defined by 
the Department of Justice as: 
 
…an analysis of how information in identifiable form is collected, 
stored, protected, shared, and managed in an IT system or online 
collection.73 
 
The application of the technique varies. Some of the most detailed practical 
guidance has been issued by the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner.74 PIAs 
are generally seen as an anticipatory instrument, to be ideally included at the 
‘concept definition stage’ of systems development. In practice, it is a tool that 
can be used by private and public sectors, in particular for medium to large 
businesses and government agencies. The assessment can be undertaken 
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internally, providing the assessor has ‘sound analytical and writing skills’ and 
there is ‘some external or independent oversight’.75 Projects warranting a PIA 
can vary from obvious candidates such as the components of the proposed 
NIR to other mundane but significant projects for example merging internal 
business databases to enable new forms of client profiling or centralising a 
multi-national company’s employee records in the UK. According to the New 
Zealand Privacy Commissioner, a typical PIA should include: 
 
- Description of the project and information flows; 
- The privacy analysis: 
o Collecting and obtaining information; 
o Use, disclosure and retention of information. 
- Privacy risk assessment; 
- Privacy enhancing responses; 
- Compliance mechanisms.76 
 
Yet, in spite of guidance and activity overseas, adoption of PIAs in the UK has 
been extremely slow. Although the Performance and Innovation Unit 
recommended their use in a report published in 2002,77 there has been little 
progress since that date. In 2006, the case was further stated by the authors 
of the ICO-commissioned A Report on the Surveillance Society.78 At the same 
time, the ICO expressed its intention to support work on PIAs, seeing it as ‘still 
desirable’.79  
 
Such work would be timely, and could dovetail with the regulator’s current 
campaign against the illegal trade in personal data. Although a PIA feasibility 
study has been conducted in relation to social care provision in Scotland,80 
there is scope for further work in other policy areas. A particularly strong case 
can be made for the criminal justice sector, given the number of emerging and 
consolidated databases currently overseen by the Home Office and the 
police.81 There are also overseas precedents in this sector, with PIAs being 
used by the United States in relation to Department of Justice / FBI 
databases, and in Hong Kong with regard to a ‘new generation’ national 
identity card scheme.82 Although there has been uncertainty in the United 
States about whether PIAs can comprehensively address the privacy 
implications of authentication systems at federal level,83 PIAs can usefully 
provide a ‘macro level’ look at privacy issues in e-government and business 
contexts. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The report on the illegal trade in personal data and campaigning for the 
introduction of custodial sentences is indicative of the more ‘interventionist’ 
stance being taken by the ICO, asserting greater influence over legislation 
and policy-making. In this respect, it has been seen that the ICO is ahead of 
other national data protection regulators. However, increased sentencing 
powers cannot alone be regarded as a panacea. Their value as a deterrent is 
difficult to predict, although the ICO argue that a number of central 
government departments, and the police, support a much tougher approach to 
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punishing those involved with illegal disclosure.84 This new approach will 
require monitoring and regular review – by the Information Commissioner and 
independently - to measure its impact. 
 
At the same time, greater compliance with the DPA 1998 also needs to be 
encouraged in order to ensure that new information systems are developed in 
privacy friendly ways. Greater attention has to be paid to the assessment of 
risk. In this paper, the adoption of PIAs – pioneered in New Zealand, 
mandated in the US and Canada – has been suggested as part of the 
solution. In May 2007 the Information Commissioner, in evidence submitted to 
a Home Affairs Committee Inquiry, placed renewed emphasis on PIAs.85 The 
effectiveness of such a tool, and how it balances with more punitive measures 
designed to deter breaches of data protection principles, would also benefit 
from a comprehensive evaluation.  
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